

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

RICHARD EDWARD BUCHANAN,)	
Plaintiff,)	
v.)	No. 3:16-CV-2164-B
)	
BRAD LIVINGSTON and DAVID)	
GUTIERREZ,)	
Defendants.)	

**FINDINGS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and an order of the District Court, this case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge follow:

I. Background

Plaintiff filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He is proceeding *pro se* and the Court has granted him leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. Defendants are Texas Department of Criminal Justice Director Brad Livingston and Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles Director David Gutierrez. Process has not issued pending preliminary screening.

Plaintiff claims Defendants are unlawfully denying him release to mandatory supervision and have denied him credit for street time. Plaintiff seeks immediate release, discharge of his sentence and money damages.

II. Screening

Plaintiff's complaint is subject to preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. That section provides in pertinent part:

The court shall review . . . as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil

action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity [and] [o]n review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), a district court may also summarily dismiss a complaint filed *in forma pauperis* if it concludes the action is : (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]” *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” *Id.* at 555. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

III. Discussion


Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). *Heck* holds that a prisoner cannot bring a § 1983 action challenging his conviction or confinement unless and until the reason for his continued detention has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, or otherwise declared invalid by a state tribunal or federal court, such as through a writ of habeas corpus. *Heck* also bars damage claims, which, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or confinement. *Hamilton v. Lyons*, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5th Cir. 1996).

If the Court granted relief in this case, Petitioner would be entitled to immediate release from confinement. His claims therefore necessarily imply the invalidity of his continued confinement. Plaintiff, however, has not shown that his continued confinement has been declared invalid. Hence, no § 1983 cause of action has yet accrued and these claims should be dismissed with prejudice until the *Heck* conditions are met. *See Johnson v. McElveen*, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating dismissal should be with prejudice until *Heck* conditions are met).¹

IV. Recommendation

The Court recommends that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice until the *Heck* conditions are met.

Signed this 6th day of September, 2016.



PAUL D. STICKNEY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

¹Although Plaintiff seeks release from custody, this relief is not available under § 1983. A petitioner must file a petition for writ of habeas corpus to seek release from custody. *See Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973); *Carson v. Johnson*, 112 F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that a petition for writ of habeas corpus permits a petitioner to seek immediate or earlier release from custody, whereas a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the proper avenue to challenge unconstitutional conditions of confinement and prison procedures).

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT**

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).